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This Master’s thesis focuses on the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum, in particular comparing betting markets and opinion polling as 
outcome predictors. While opinion polls are the most significant data sets 
used by political scientists and the media when discussing the predicted 
outcome of elections there is evidence to suggest that betting markets may 
be more accurate predictors of eventual outcomes. Using data from 5 
months of betting and polling this research paper confirms this previous 
research in the case of the 2014 Scottish referendum. An outcome of this is 
the conflict between intention’ and ‘expectation as research questions, the 
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The focus of this Master’s thesis is prediction models looking 
specifically at whether betting markets or opinion polls were a better 
predictor of the outcome of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. It 
also considers the effects of broadcast television debates and the impact 
these results could have on the media as well as on political communication 
theory.  
The recent Scottish independence referendum, held on September 19, 
2014, was a landmark event not just in British history but for any sovereign 
nation. Going back to the 1707 Treaty of Union, this 300-year economic and 
political pact could be said to be a well-known success story. Britain has, by 
all accounts for a country with a population of just under 65 million and a 
landmass less than the size of Texas, “punched well above its weight” on the 
world stage. Yet as the polls closed on September the 18th pundits across 
the country and even internationally were stating that the break-up vote was  
“too close to call.” (Cross, 2014) 
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However, media analysts who looked at political prediction data other 
than opinion polling saw something completely different happening when it 
came to betting markets. Professor David Bell, of Stirling University, 
Scotland, writing for the website Future UK and Scotland (Bell, 2014), 
stated: 
The latest odds (Sunday 14th September) show that the implied 
probability of a No vote, based on the odds offered by 24 bookmakers 
up to midday on Sep 14th have stabilized at around 0.8. The market 
estimates of the probability of a No vote are consistently higher than 
the opinion polls suggest…The latest data show that the bookmakers 
odds suggest an 80 per cent chance of a No outcome, while the opinion 
polls are close to evens – a 50 per cent chance of a No vote. 
 
The question thus needs to be asked, “How could two sets of data 
aimed at predicting the same result be so different?” Australian economist 
and public policy scholar Justin Wolfers (2014) believes the difference in 
statistical results can be derived from the type of questions asked. Wolfers 
claims that the error of analysis when comparing opinion polling vs betting 
markets is that opinion polling typically asks its respondents who they will 
vote for, whereas in betting markets those investing money are betting on 
who they predict will win. Wolfers states, “Typically, asking people who they 
think will win yields better forecasts, possibly because it leads them to also 
reflect on the opinions of those around them, and perhaps also because it 
may yield more honest answers.” 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
The topic of predictive models in political forecasting is an interesting 
one and has produced some thought-provoking academic research.  New 
Yorker business columnist James Surowiecki (2005), in his book The Wisdom 
of Crowds, explores the concept that large groups given access to 
information can be surprisingly insightful when it comes to predicting future 
events, even surpassing the accuracy of small groups of elite knowledge 
holders.  
The following literature review explores the concept of The Wisdom of 
Crowds, the history of research into betting markets vs opinion polling, how 
the type of question asked can alter predictive models as well as the topic of 
precision journalism. In doing so it will also analyze the methodologies 
adopted by various researchers in this field in order to aid in the formation 
of a research methodology. 
 
The Wisdom of Crowds 
 
The idea that large groups of people are smarter than a smaller group 
of elite knowledge holders is key to this concept. The theory that groups are 
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remarkably intelligent and often smarter than the smartest people in them, 
demonstrates how businesses operate, how knowledge is increased, how 
economies are structured and how people live their daily lives. 
The Wisdom of Crowds posits that the masses are better problem 
solvers, forecasters, and decision makers than any one individual. Contrary 
to having inadequate amounts of information, limited foresight, or irrational 
ideas that affect judgment, collective intelligence is what author Surowiecki 
(2005) refers to as the wisdom of crowds. 
Surowiecki (2005, p. intro xix) argues that in many cases a diverse 
group can solve problems better than a small number of experts due to the 
group aggregating and producing “collective judgments that represent not 
what any one person in the group thinks but rather, in some sense, what 
they all think.” 
Surowiecki points to four key elements that summarize why group 
decision making is so effective: diversity, independence, decentralization 
and aggregation. Diversity of opinion means individuals have some private 
information or their own interpretation of known facts. Independence comes 
when people’s opinions are not influenced by those around them. 
Decentralization means people draw on local knowledge, while aggregation 
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demonstrates that a mechanism exists for turning individual judgments into 
a collective decision. 
The author deals with many kinds of group decision making as well as 
predictive models. In one such instance he describes how the Las Vegas 
Mirage Hotel and Casino’s chief bookmaker Robert Walker sets the odds on 
sports’ betting prices, or rather doesn’t. His primary role is to “set the line” 
or the chances by which placing a bet on either side in a sports match will 
pay-off for the gambler by initially looking at who is the favorite etc. 
However, after the line is set it is the influence of the gamblers that alters 
the odds. As money is placed on one team or a prediction of points 
over/under, the line moves. Surowiecki (2005, p. 13) states: 
 In theory, you could set the opening line wherever, and simply 
allow it to adjust from there automatically, so that the point spread 
would rise or fall anytime there was a significant imbalance between the 
amounts wagered on each side.  
 
Surowiecki claims this method is so reliable that you would be hard 
pressed to find an individual who has successfully outperformed the betting 
crowd. The author points out that in three quarters of NFL game outcomes 




Despite praise for the wisdom of crowds, research by a team of 
European social scientists published in 2011 (Lorenza, Rauhutb, Schweitz, & 
Helbing, 2011) shows that crowd wisdom when performing estimation tasks 
is undermined by social influence. In a controlled experiment two groups 
were asked to perform various mathematical estimation tasks. One group 
was exposed to each other’s estimates and allowed to change their 
individual estimates after consulting with the rest of their group while the 
second group’s estimation tasks were performed completely independently. 
The group that was not exposed to other group member’s estimates had a 
higher aggregated accuracy. This produces three effects: 
The “social influence effect” diminishes the diversity of the crowd 
without improvement of its collective error. The “range reduction effect” 
moves the position of the truth to peripheral regions of the range of 
estimates so that the crowd becomes less reliable in providing expertise 
for external observers. The “confidence effect” boosts individual’s 
confidence after convergence of their estimates despite lack of 
improved accuracy. (Lorenza, Rauhutb, Schweitz, & Helbing, 2011 no.2 
vol. 108, p. 1) 
 
The authors point to a real-world example of this kind of socially 
influenced group error, that of misled elites and the global financial crisis. 
Yet despite this we are led by Surowiecki to the College of Business at 
the University of Iowa where a social experiment founded in 1988 and based 
on political predictions has produced surprisingly accurate results. The Iowa 
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Electronic Markets (IEM) is a project that is open to anyone and allows 
people to buy and sell futures “contracts” based on how they believe 
candidates will perform in upcoming elections. In a study of IEM’s 
performance in forty-nine different elections between 1988 and 2000 its 
election-eve prices were off, on average, by just “1.37 percent in 
presidential elections, 3.43 percent in other U.S elections and 2.12 percent 
in foreign elections.” (Surowiecki, 2005, p. 18) 
What’s more surprising is when compared to another group predictor 
model, opinion polling, three-fourths of the time IEM’s market prices on each 
day the polls were released were more accurate. Not only was IEM more 
accurate at predicting eventual outcomes but it was also consistently less 
volatile and changed less dramatically in response to new publicly available 
information and events.  
 
Betting markets vs opinion polling 
 
In recent years, prediction markets have drawn the attention of 
scholars (Arrow, Forsythe, Wolfers, & Zitzewitz, 2008; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 
2004). Markets where money is wagered on the success of a candidate are a 
centerpiece of this discussion. Indeed, information-market proponents have 
8 
 
promoted the success of election markets as a basis for advocating 
prediction markets in other realms. A common claim is that prices in election 
markets, such as the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), predict elections better 
than “trial heat” polls that register vote preferences prior to Election Day 
(Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, & Rietz, 2008). Other research (Rhode & Strumpf, 
2004) shows that voting markets even in the era before scientific polling had 
a strong record of accuracy. 
What market proponents have also shown is that IEM vote share 
prices during campaigns align closer to the final vote than do trial-heat poll 
margins consecutively measured during the campaign (Berg, Forsythe, 
Nelson, & Rietz, 2008). In this sense, it appears that market prices are 
better than polls at predicting the exact election-day vote margin. 
While these results are intriguing, the best test of whether market 
prices or polls are a stronger predictor would be to pit them against each 
other as independent variables in a standard multivariate analysis 
forecasting the outcome (Erikson & Wlezein, 2012 vol. 31 issue 3). Erikson 
and Wleizen state that the six presidential elections between 1992 and 2012 
do not include a large enough amount of data in order to perform this 
analysis when comparing opinion polling and the Iowa Electronic Market.  
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To give a greater historical record of prediction market success, Rhode 
and Strumpf (2004) compiled data from election markets that thrived on the 
Wall Street curb, an independent betting market involving Wall-Street 
traders, going back from at least as far as 1880, and up to 1960. To add to 
this, Snowberg, Wolfers, & Zitzewitz (2007) assembled election-eve prices 
from these Wall Street Curb markets, contemporary electronic markets, and, 
for most of the intervening years, London bookmaker odds. Thus, Erikson 
and Wlezein (2012) as well as Berg, Forsythe, Nelson & Rietz (2008) were 
able to compare election-eve market prices and election-eve trial-heat polls 
as predictors of presidential elections for 16 data points—all presidential 
elections from 1936 through 2008 except for 1964, 1968, and 1972, for 
which there appeared to be no market data. 
Together these researchers allow us to have some understanding of 
the historical performance of election markets. The curb election markets of 
the pre-poll era were “thick” markets, meaning markets with a high level of 
participation and investment (Rhode & Strumpf 2004). In an atmosphere in 
which many gamblers used their hearts to bet on their political favorites, 
others could use their heads to exploit the market for personal gain. The 
larger “heart” gambling group’s actions set the prices in a way that reflected 
the fundamentals of the election and mimicked the understanding of election 
10 
 
outcomes in the current era where the campaign news is dominated by 
stories about who is ahead in the polling horserace. In these respects, the 
early election markets approached the conditions for an ideal information 
market (Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). 
According to Erikson and Wlezein (2012) when polls supplanted betting 
markets as the major predictive mechanism, the quality of election 
forecasting actually sank, at least for the short run. In the early days of 
polling, through at least 1948, the polls were less accurate than the betting 
markets that had pre-dated them. It turns out that the availability of public 
opinion polls affects the accuracy of election markets. Once polls entered the 
picture, betting markets thinned and remaining presidential betting markets 
became heavily dependent on what the polls were showing. Even when the 
polls were inaccurate, for example in 1948 when most polls predicted Dewey 
over Truman, the market followed the polls.  
Yet further research by Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, & Rietz (2008) shows 
that given a long term comparison of betting markets versus poll data in the 
16 available presidential data sets, the former proves to be the longer term 
and more consistent predictor of eventual outcomes.  
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Arrow, Forsythe, Wolfers & Zitzewitz (2008) give us a concise 
explanation why betting market predictions are so accurate (Arrow, 
Forsythe, Wolfers, & Zitzewitz, 2008, p. 2): 
Prediction markets reflect a fundamental principle underlying the value 
of market-based pricing: Because information is often widely dispersed 
among economic actors, it is highly desirable to find a mechanism to 
collect and aggregate that information. Free markets usually manage 
this process well because almost anyone can participate, and the 
potential for profit (and loss) creates strong incentives to search for 
better information.  
 
An important point that Erikson and Wleizen (2012, p. 2) make when 
analyzing their data is that market prices and vote margins are measures of 
different things. The authors state, “Whereas market prices reflect forecasts 
of the expected vote on Election Day, the polls register vote intentions when 
the polls were taken.”  
 
 
“How will you vote?” vs “who will win?” 
 
Research conducted by University of Pennsylvania’s David Rothschild 
and Justin Wolfers (2012) explores the value of the political polling question: 
Who do you think will win the upcoming election? The authors attempt to 
demonstrate that expectation-of-outcome questions point to the winning 
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candidate more often than the standard political polling question of voter 
intention: If the election were held today, who would you vote for? 
Wolfer’s (2014) states in an article for the New York Times regarding 
the Scottish referendum that, “it [an expectation-of-outcome question] leads 
them [polling respondents] to also reflect on the opinions of those around 
them, and perhaps also because it may yield more honest answers.” 
In essence Rothschild and Wolfer’s research is based on the deduction 
that when asking about voting intentions researchers are only receiving a 
response that includes one piece of the responder’s information set. The 
respondents know their own values and thus use that information to produce 
an answer to the question. However, by asking the responders to think 
about what they expect the likely result to be, not only are researchers 
tapping into the responders own personal views but they are also asking the 
responders to delve into information they gathered from their interactions 
with others; friends and families voting intentions, for example. Thus, by 
asking for the expected outcome researchers are delving into a much deeper 
and richer data set. 
In terms of using betting markets vs opinion polling this may be a key 
insight. Whereas the wisdom of crowds in the opinion polling model, based 
on the question of intent to vote, is a predictor model that uses a limited 
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amount of information, the betting market’s crowd wisdom includes a much 
richer information bank with which decisions are being made. Gamblers, by 
instinct, do not bet based on their personal preference but on aggregated 
information gathered from the world around them. 
In Rothschild and Wolfer’s study the authors looked at polling data 
from all the state-level presidential electoral-college races from 1952 to 
2008, where both the intention and expectation question were asked. In the 
77 cases in which the intention and expectation question were both asked, 
the expectation questioned picked the winner 60 times, while the intention 
question only picked the winner 17 times. That is, 78 percent of the time 
where these two approaches disagree, the expectation data was correct. 
While this insight is explanatory in answering why betting markets are 
more accurate predictor models, Rothschild and Wolfers believe that their 





The idea of using social science techniques in journalism can be traced back 
to the 1920s when Walter Lippman (1922, p 216) stated, “The more points, 
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then, at which any happening can be fixed, objectified, measured, named, 
the more points there are at which news can occur.” In this way Lippmann 
noted that the scientific method could be used to make journalism 
objectified and measured. 
However, the later 20th century push for the use of social science 
techniques in journalism is widely attributed to journalist and futurist Philip 
Meyer. First published in 1970 Meyer’s book, Precision Journalism, called on 
journalists to employ social science techniques in order to become more 
objective. 
In a recent edition Meyer (2002) wrote: 
The world has become so complicated, the growth of available 
information so explosive, that the journalist needs to be a filter, as well 
as a transmitter; an organizer and interpreter, as well as one who 
gathers and delivers facts. . . . In short a journalist has to be a 
database manager, a data processor, and a data analyst. 
 
 Meyer explains that there are several data processes required in order 
to satisfy this practice: collection, storage, retrieval, analysis, reduction and 
communication. In Meyer’s opinion, journalists share the same 
characteristics as scientists: skepticism, openness, an instinct for 
operationalization, a sense of the tentativeness of truth and parsimony. 
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Yet despite Meyer’s call for the use of social science techniques 
scholars have cautioned the use of inadequate surveys or polls by the 
media. In a 1981 paper (McCombs et el. 1981) the author’s state: 
It is our experience that many editors are far too hesitant to 
challenge polls which are brought to them as news by people who 
simply do not know how to do a survey or who know but have some 
ulterior purpose in getting a deceptive poll into the media. While few at 
the level of editorial decision have a great deal of technical expertise, 
many of them have young reporters who are recent journalism school 
graduates with the skills to exercise proper editorial judgment. We are 
trying to persuade the editors to take better advantage of this in-house 
knowledge. 
 
Alongside badly conducted opinion polling lies the issue of the media 
assuming the role of creating news. Pollster Burns Roper warned that while 
the traditional role of the journalist was to report what others have said and 
done, the use of tools such as opinion polls led to them being in the position 
of making news not merely reporting it. In this way journalists are in danger 
of reporting polls in the same manner as an event that they had no control 
over, such as a traffic accident, when that is not the case. (Atkin and 
Gaudino 1984) 
Another problem pointed out by Atkin and Gaudino (1984, p128) is the 
inability of journalists to interpret poll data adequately. The authors point 
out, “Journalists typically lack understanding of the limitations of polling, 
particularly the problem of uninformed opinions.” 
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It is this statement that is central to one of the main themes of this 
thesis: the type of question being asked and the interpretation of the data 
that follows.  Thus the question of precision must not only be asked but also 
how this affects the media’s interpretation and communication of the results. 
If accuracy is a determining factor in precision then we can attempt to 
identify where accuracy may be improved. 
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
 
This thesis asks two questions. Initially, during the 2014 Scottish 
Independence referendum campaign was the betting market or opinion 
polling a more accurate predictor of the outcome (winner)? And secondly, 
did the broadcast of television debates have any effect on either betting 
market or opinion polling probability? 
The purpose of asking these questions, in the context of the 2014 
Scottish Independence referendum, is not only to determine accuracy at a 
case-study level but also to prompt discussion regarding possible reasons for 




After analyzing prior research into this field, it is assumed that betting 
markets will be a consistently more accurate predictor of the eventual 
outcome. Also, looking into the research surrounding ‘precision journalism’ 
and media effects we can deduce that the television debates should have a 
more significant effect on opinion polls than betting markets. 
Using this research this thesis will also take into account not only 
accuracy of predictive data markets but also more precisely the difference 
between intention and expectation as polling questions, the theory of Spiral 
of Silence as well as what this could mean for not only ‘precision journalism’ 
but more precisely the possible effects on the public of opinion polls reported 






Chapter 3  
Methods 
In order to compare these two prediction models data was gathered, 
converted to probability and then compared. 
Probability: 
The reason probability was chosen is that it is a measure of the 
likeliness that an event will occur. The data sets were converted to a 
comparable probability in the following way: 
Probability runs in a scale from 0 to 1 
Betting odds for an outcome of either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ are presented in 
decimal form. For example if the odds of a ‘no’ outcome are 1.25, this 
means that the market would give you .25 for every 1 you invest in this 
prediction. In order to convert this to probability 1 was divided by the 
decimal odd. So a market price of 1.25 for a ‘no’ outcome would become a 
probability of 1/1.25=0.8. 
Opinion polling is shown in percentages. Given a particular sample the 
responses will be either ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘undecided’. The probability, in this case 
is shown by converting the percentage into a 0 to 1 decimal scale. So if 55% 
of a sample say they will vote for ‘No’ then this gives the probability of a ‘no’ 
outcome as 0.55. However, there was a data comparison error, because 
19 
 
betting markets only have two variables and opinion polling has three (with 
‘undecided’ being the third) it had to be decided how to factor this third 
category in. For the purpose of this research, as it involved statistical 
comparison, it was decided to remove the undecided vote and recalculate 
percentages based on a reduced sample. For example if a poll sample is 200 
with 10% undecided, 50% Yes and 40% No the recalculation would look 
like: 
Of original sample: undecided=20, Yes=100, No=80. 
Reduced sample (less undecided) =180 
New percentages 100 of 180 = 55.6% Yes 80 of 180=44.4% No  
Sampling: 
The betting market data was drawn from the website 
‘oddschecker.com’. This provides a historical record of the betting market 
odds of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ outcome from 23 online betting sites. These odds were 
then used to calculate a daily average using Excel. 
Opinion polls were identified using the British Polling Council. These 
polls are from organizations that fully disclose their findings and 
methodology. Three methods of conducting polls have been used by the 
polling companies. YouGov, Survation and Panelbase conduct polls online; 
Ipsos Mori conduct their polls by telephone, ICM conduct online and 
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telephone polls for different clients, and TNS BMRB use face-to-face 
interviews. There are variations in the questions used by each company, with 
TNS BMRB, ICM and Panelbase asking respondents how they intend to vote 
on 18 September 2014, while YouGov, Survation and Ipsos Mori ask their 
respondents how they would vote if the referendum were held immediately. 
Headline figures from ICM, Panelbase, Survation and Ipsos MORI only 
show those who say they are certain or very likely to vote in referendum. 
TNS BMRB and YouGov headline figures show voting intention for all voters. 
Some of the polls are conducted in conjunction with media organizations 
whilst others are conducted on behalf of either the ‘Yes’ or ‘Better Together’ 
campaigns. Given that these polls tend to be spread out and were being 
compared with a daily data set (betting markets) for this research all the 
available polls were used to create a comparable timeline. 
Timeline: 
For comparison a timeline of predicted probability was created from 
betting markets and opinion polls. The betting markets begin to show 
substantial pricing of the eventual outcome around May of 2014, so this 
timeline consisted of five months from May until the outcome of the 
referendum in September. 
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As well as creating a timeline of betting market and opinion polling 
probability for Yes and No to Scottish independence this study also created a 
timeline including the broadcast of television debates to see if these events 
could be observed to have had an effect on either polling or betting market 
probability. 
The the eventual results of the Scottish referendum were used to 
evaluate how these probabilities performed. 
 
Accuracy: 
The aggregated betting market and opinion polling was compared with 
the eventual result in terms of outcome. So each data set was evaluated 
based on which showed a greater significance in predicting the overall 







Following the above methodology betting market data from the 23 
available online betting shops was collected over a five-month period (May-
September 2014) and input into Excel. Using Excel formula all data was 
aggregated by date and an aggregated probability was also calculated for 
each date. 
The same process was followed for Opinion Polls. From all available 
British Polling Council polls over the five-month period. This was input into 
excel, all data was aggregated by date and an aggregated probability was 
calculated for each date. 
No issues were encountered gathering data from sources and excel 
proved a useful tool for both calculating aggregated probabilities as well as 
creating charts for analysis. A selection of the data can be seen in Appendix 
A: Sample of raw data. 







Comparison of probabilities: Betting Markets vs Opinion Polling 
 





This research focused on accuracy of predicted outcome winner/loser 
and not on predicted vote share (which could be the focus of further 
research), thus, findings are discussed in that regard. 
As we can see from Figures A and B both betting markets and opinion 
polls predicted the correct outcome. However, betting markets predicted the 
outcome with a much higher certainty. The difference in probabilities 
between the no/yes outcomes from the betting markets ranges from 0.37 to 
.75 compared to 0 to 0.28 for the opinion polls. This gets even more 
significant when you look at the data during September, the lead-up to the 
referendum. While both sets of data show a closure of the gap between yes 
and no outcomes the betting markets maintain a gap of least 0.32 between 
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the two outcomes whereas the opinion polls draw the two outcomes together 
around even with Yes overtaking No as a predicted outcome at one point. 
 
Figure A: Betting Markets probability No/Yes outcome 
 
Figure B: Opinion Polling probability No/Yes outcome 
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Further, the following chart, figure C, compares the difference in 
probability between Yes and No outcomes in regards to the betting market 
and opinion polling. As we can see the difference in probability between Yes 
and No outcomes in regards to the betting market data is statistically 
greater. Thus betting markets predicted the eventual until with a much 
higher degree of certainty for the duration of our 5 month sample. This 
allows us to see that betting markets were a consistently more accurate 
predictor of the eventual outcome of the 2014 Scottish Independence 
Referendum. 
 





Figures D and E further illustrate this point with the betting markets 
consistently predicting a ‘No’ Win with a higher consistent probability and 
opinion polls consistently giving the ‘Yes’ outcome a higher probability of 
success. This illustrates that from this research we can deduce that for the 5 
month run-up to the 2014 Scottish referendum betting markets were a more 
consistently confident predictor of the eventual outcome. 
 




Figure E: Opinion Polling vs Betting Markets No outcome 
 
This data and the charts that we were able to create allow us to 
visualize and conclude that, in this case, betting markets were not only a 
more accurate predictor of the eventual outcome of the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum than opinion polls but that betting markets were 
also a more consistent and confident predictor of the eventual outcome. 
 
Effect of television debates on Betting Markets and Opinion Polling 
 
During the referendum campaign there were three televised debates 
broadcast on national television throughout the UK. The first two debates 
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were between the leaders of the two respective campaigns: Alistair Darling 
for the Better Together/No campaign and Alex Salmond for the Yes 
campaign. The final debate included a panel of four politicians: Deputy First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon and Scottish Green Party leader Patrick Harvie from 
the Yes campaign, and Scottish Conservative Party leader Ruth 




Salmond & Darling: The Debate 
The First debate, broadcast on Scottish National Television and 
available online throughout the UK on August 5th 2014, including opening 
statements, cross-examination, audience questions and closing statements 
from both leaders. A snap poll conducted by ICM (“Debate: Snap Poll 
declares”, 2014) after the debate stated that Darling had won the debate 
56% to 44%. Analysis of the poll and following the debate by Professor John 
Curtis (Curtis, “who won the”, 2014) stated that: 
People often see events through the prism of their existing 
convictions. Yes supporters might be expected to think that Mr Salmond 
had won, while we might anticipate that No voters would be inclined to 
feel that Mr Darling had the better of the argument. Given that the 
latter group is the more numerous, Mr Darling would have emerged as 
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the ‘winner’ even if all both gentlemen did was to appeal to their own 
side. 
This indeed is largely what happened. Most existing No supporters 
(78%) adjudged Mr Darling to be the winner while a majority of Yes 
backers (67%) believed Mr Salmond had emerged on top.  There is 
perhaps just a hint in the difference between the two numbers that Mr 
Salmond’s performance came as a bit of a disappointment to some Yes 
supporters. On the other hand, the First Minister emerged narrowly 
ahead  – by 44% to 36% amongst undecided voters – though given 
only 63 undecided voters responded to the poll, not much can be made 
of that difference. 
 
Despite this analysis the debate was reported by The Herald, Daily 
Record, The Times and Scottish Daily Mail as a win for Darling and the Better 
Together campaign (“The front pages”, August 6 2014).1 This adds weight of 
evidence to the case that sometimes journalists lack the ability to properly 
decipher data when reporting polls as news. 
When we look at Figure F (The effect of televised debates on opinion 
polls) we can see that the first debate had a short term effect on opinion 
polls with an increase in the probability of a No win and a decrease in the 
probability of a Yes win.  
                                   
 




Figure F: Effect of televised debates on Opinion Polling probability No/Yes 
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Looking at Figure G (The effect of televised debates on betting 
markets) we can see no identifiable effect. 
 
Figure G: Effect of televised debates on Betting Markets probability No/Yes 
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It is difficult to determine whether the poll reaction is purely the result 
of the debate, poll or in fact the way that they were both reported by the 
media. However, what can be seen is that opinion polls were affected and 
betting markets were not.   
 
Scotland Decides: Salmond versus Darling 
The second debate involving the leaders of both campaigns was 
broadcast on BBC Scotland and was available throughout the UK on August 
25, 2014. The debate followed the same format as the previous STV debate. 
Following the debate a snap poll conducted by ICM claimed that 
Salmond had won the debate by 71% to 29% (Curtis, “Salmond wins…”, 
2014). However, further analysis of this poll, by Professor Curtis determined 
that these percentages were recalculated after 9 percent of the poll 
respondents who were unable to determine a winner were removed. 
Furthermore when looking at the section of the poll regarding voting 
intentions Curtis notes: 
Before the debate, 44% of those who took part in the poll (which 
as a sample of those who watched the debate is not necessarily 
representative of Scots as a whole and the figures for which should thus 
not be compared with those for ICM’s regular polls) said that they would 
vote Yes in September, while 46% indicated they intended to vote No. 
After the debate both tallies increased by just one point to 45% and 
47% respectively (while Don’t Knows fell from 10% to 8%). Once the 
Don’t Knows are left to one side, that meant that the Yes side were on 
33 
 
49% before the debate and 49% after! Only if we calculate the figures 
to one decimal point (which in truth is far more precision than an 
exercise of this kind can be expected to deliver) can we see that the Yes 
vote might have edged up a smidgeon – by one half of a point. 
 
However, again of note is the way the debate, and in turn this poll, 
were reported by the media. The Herald, Daily Record and The Scottish Sun 
all reported a win for Yes leader Alex Salmond, choosing to omit the fact 
that the poll had found little to no increase in voting intentions (“Salmond v 
Darling –what the Scottish…” 2014).2 Again, this is an example of either the 
media’s inability to properly decipher poll data or their decision to be 
selective when doing so. 
If we look at Figure F for the weeks following this debate we see a 
narrowing of the probability of a Yes and No outcome in the opinion polls. 
Around September 5 the probability of a Yes and No outcome come together 
at 50/50. While there is a reaction in the betting markets it is not quite as 
dramatic as in opinion polls. Despite following a similar trend the difference 
between a Yes/No outcome in the betting markets never closes further than 
0.35 with No remaining the most probable outcome. It can be suggested 
                                   
 




that this trend could actually be a reaction to the opinion polls. As polls 
tighten more money is put on a Yes outcome in the betting markets, 
however, not enough to cover the imbalance created by the amount already 
being placed on No. 
What we can deduce is that, again, either the televised debate or the 
coverage of it by the media had a more significant impact on opinion polls 
than betting markets. Additionally we can say that opinion polls and their 
coverage by the media could also impact betting markets. 
 
Scotland Decides: The Big, Big debate 
The third and final debate was broadcast on BBC Scotland, and 
nationally online, on September 11, 2014. The format was a panel 
discussion in which an audience of around 7500 16-17 year-old first-time 
voters presented questions to the various panel members. The discussion 
included topics such as taxation, oil reserves, banking, poverty and how to 
protect the National Health Service in Scotland. Given the nature of the 
discussion format and the lack of any clear identifiable side there are no 
indications to suggest that this debate had any effect on either opinion polls 






Intention vs Expectation 
If it is assumed that the main difference between betting markets and 
opinion polls is that one is a measure of group expectation and the other is a 
measure of personal intention then group expectation appears to be a more 
accurate way of predicting a political outcome, in this case the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum, than calculating personal intentions. 
It appears that the difference lies in the amount of information used to 
process a decision. Basing that prediction on not only personal choices but 
also the world around them an individual is better prepared to make an 
informed decision. Once a number of these predictions are grouped together 
and aggregated, as is the case in betting markets, it appears there is a much 
more accurate way of predicting outcomes than opinion polling. 
However, what this suggests is that perhaps instead of viewing betting 
markets as a more accurate prediction model there might be a way to 
actually improve opinion polling. Instead of basing the poll on voter 
intentions, pollsters could in fact poll expectations. This is a theory that 
would need to be tested, however, given what is seen in this and other 
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research there is evidence to suggest that a switch from intention to 
expectation could yield more accurate results. 
There is, however, a curious side-effect of looking into the difference 
between intention and expectation and in particular the Scottish referendum. 
That is, how this measures up against the theory of the Spiral of Silence. 
 
Effect on ‘Spiral of Silence’ 
This theory, proposed by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-
Meumann (Noelle-Neumann 1974), suggests that individuals fear isolation. 
When presented with an opinion contrary to their own, that appears to be 
more dominant, this leads to the individual remaining silent instead of 
voicing his or her opinion.  
It has also been posited that the media play a crucial role in setting 
this dominant opinion (Miller 2005). The media, through coverage of certain 
events, play a role in portraying public opinion. Individuals, through media 
consumption, are able to gauge public opinion thus determining whether 
they feel they are in the minority. 
Futhermore, when it comes to political polling, Noelle-Neumann 
theorized that once people are able to quasi-statistically gauge public 
opinion they are reluctant to go against that perceived majority. When this 
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comes to polling, the theory suggests, often undecided participants make a 
subconscious calculation of how most people would answer and choose to 
conform to that calculation. 
However, what this research shows is that people who made informed 
calculations based on group expectancy (political gamblers), and even the 
majority of the polls, showed that the No campaign was consistently in the 
majority. Thus if we are to assume that people on the No side knew, from 
group expectation, that they were in the majority why was this not reflected 
in the polls? 
The spiral of silence does not state that the majority has to be a 
statistically calculated majority but could in fact be a perceived majority. 
This is influenced by either one side being more publicly vocal or at least 
presented by the media as being dominant. In the case of the Scottish 
referendum the No campaign even referred to itself as the “silent majority” 
(“Scottish independence: the silent…” 2014). While the Yes campaign were 
perceived, specifically on social media, as being more dominant and vocal 
(Cookson 2014). 
What research shows is that political gamblers are more prone to 
making informed decisions. They will analyze polls and other data in order to 
determine an expectation of a certain outcome. However, participants in a 
38 
 
political poll do not have the benefit of this. They are asked to immediately 
calculate their intention. Thus, it can be suggested that polling participants 
are more prone to being swayed by a perceived majority rather than a 
factually calculated majority such as that taken into account by those 
investing in betting markets. 
It is suggested, therefore, that the general public are persuaded by 
the way the mass media portray political campaigns and also, as this 
research suggested, how the media portrays public opinion. If the media are 
inaccurate or selective in their portrayal of polls, such as the televised 
debate snap polls, then the public will be given an inaccurate or selective 
perception. It is these individuals, who do not sit and analyze the true 
content of the polls, who as the spiral of silence suggests, may be swayed by 
this perceived majority and thus distort the accuracy of polls. 
  
Reporting of Opinion Polls and Media Effects 
It is very hard to calculate media effects, however, what we have seen 
from the research in this field is that the media can misinterpret or 
communicate data either inaccurately or selectively. What we also see is that 
there appears to be a correlation between what the media presents as public 
opinion and a change in opinion polling probability of outcomes. The spiral of 
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silence also suggests that the media play a role in forming individual’s 
perceptions of public opinion. This, in turn, can affect certain an individual’s 
desire to either voice his or her opinion or in certain cases even conform to 
that perceived majority opinion. 
Therefore, there appears to be a socio-political loop involving the 
public, opinion polling and the media. What we see from the Scottish 
television debates is that first the public are polled on their reaction, then 
the media report these polls (sometimes inaccurately), the public perceives 
opinion through this reporting and thus resulting polls are distorted in some 
way. Therefore in a way media by conducting polls and reporting on them 
are influencing the reliability of further polling which is in turn reported and 
the cycle continues. This means that the media have to be especially careful 
to report data completely accurately and without bias. If they don’t they are 










Findings and Recommendations for Further Research 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze betting markets and opinion 
polling as predictors of political outcomes, specifically focusing on the 2014 
Scottish Independence Referendum. In doing so prior research was analyzed 
and a study was conducted to discover the predictive accuracy of betting 
markets and opinion polling during the final 5 months of the referendum 
campaign. 
Betting markets appear to be a more consistent, reliable and accurate 
predictor of political outcomes. Further than that it is the difference between 
expectation and intention that drives this differentiation. However, this was 
just one study that focused on one set of outcomes. To further study 
intention vs expectation a larger study focusing on intention and expectation 
as polling question and their accuracy in predicting political outcomes should 
be conducted. 
Another factor can also be seen in this research: motivation. It 
appears that motivation to predict an outcome, in this case the motivation 
for gamblers to make monetary gains, drives individuals to collect data that 
can better predict outcomes. In this case it is seen that group expectation is 
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a better data source than canvassing personal intention. However, this 
brings up an area that needs further consideration. If we assume that 
individuals are motivated to predict an outcome correctly, be that individuals 
who are invested either monetarily or politically, then it is assumed that 
there is a scale upon which individuals collect more accurate data in order to 
predict an outcome. 
If we look at statistician Nate Silver (“Obama win, Nate Silver wins…” 
2012) and his correct prediction of the exact Electoral College vote during 
the 2012 Presidential election, in which Barack Obama beat challenger Mitt 
Romney, we see an individual who employs very accurate data analysis to 
predict outcomes. In fact better data analysis than even Mitt Romney’s in 
house team was using. Compare this to an individual who is polled who has 
perhaps used no data analysis and has little vested in the outcome and we 
can see there is a sliding scale from individuals such as Nate Silver down to 
individuals on the street. Therefor further studies should be conducted in 
order to determine this scale and look into just how deep this prediction data 
runs. 
Another outcome of this thesis is the effect the broadcast debates, or 
rather the reporting of these debates and resulting polling, affects opinion 
poll accuracy. Broadcast debates were chosen for this study because there 
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was an identifiable link between the debates, snap polls, media reporting of 
these polls and effects on the polling/ betting market timeline. What is seen 
is that opinion polls were more strongly affected. Another deduction is that 
the debate snap polls were either inaccurately or selectively reported by the 
mass media, in this case the print media. However, further research should 
be conducted to analyze the accuracy of media reporting of polls over 
multiple events and the effects this could have on further poll results. 
This thesis also took into account Noelle-Numan’s Spiral of Silence 
theory and how it could be applied in relation to the 2014 Scottish 
Independence Referendum. There is a correlation between public perception, 
through media reporting, of a group majority and an effect on opinion polls. 
However, what must be noted is that this theory was developed during and 
in the context of the Nazi parties rise to power in Germany. It therefor was 
influenced by a totalitarian system. This thesis involved analyzing the 
outcome of a democratic process in a democratic system. Thus, this raises 
an important point for future study: The Spiral of Silence theory needs to be 
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Appendix A: Sample of raw data 
Date BM Yes BM No BM Diff. OP Yes Op No OP Diff. 
5/2/2014 0.338728 0.779221 0.440493 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/3/2014 0.330033 0.766284 0.436251 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/4/2014 0.307692 0.753769 0.446077 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/5/2014 0.315457 0.737101 0.421643 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/6/2014 0.328947 0.719424 0.390477 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/7/2014 0.328947 0.740741 0.411793 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/8/2014 0.330215 0.737101 0.406886 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/9/2014 0.321285 0.735294 0.414009 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/10/2014 0.331126 0.719424 0.388299 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/11/2014 0.327869 0.732601 0.404732 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/12/2014 0.325733 #N/A #N/A 0.445783 0.566265 0.120482 
5/13/2014 0.327869 0.775194 0.447325 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/14/2014 0.332326 0.728597 0.396271 0.45977 0.54023 0.08046 
5/15/2014 0.316957 0.745156 0.428199 0.425 0.575 0.15 
5/16/2014 0.319234 0.744048 0.424814 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/17/2014 0.324826 0.741525 0.416699 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/18/2014 0.308582 0.746826 0.438244 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/19/2014 0.288517 0.776915 0.488398 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/20/2014 0.299252 0.756859 0.457607 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/21/2014 0.306151 0.755124 0.448973 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/22/2014 0.295359 0.757576 0.462217 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/23/2014 0.301386 0.772201 0.470814 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/24/2014 0.310421 0.8 0.489579 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/25/2014 0.31927 0.750469 0.431199 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/26/2014 0.29615 0.765306 0.469156 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
5/27/2014 0.294118 0.769231 0.475113 #N/A #N/A #N/A 
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